

TYNE AND WEAR FIRE AND RESCUE AUTHORITY

Item No. 8

MEETING: 12th DECEMBER 2016

SUBJECT: IRMP REVIEW OF RESPONSE MODEL MONITORING UPDATE

**REPORT OF THE CHIEF FIRE OFFICER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE (CLERK TO THE
AUTHORITY)**

1 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This report provides an update for Members on the implementation to date of the Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) Review of Operational Response from July 2015 to June 2016. It highlights performance for the previous year of the implementation plan (1st July 2014 to 30th June 2015) with comparisons to the previous four years.

- Year 2 refers to months 13 to 24 (1st July 2015 to 30th June 2016)
- Year 1 refers to the first 12 months following implementation (1st July 2014 to 30th June 2015)

2 BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The IRMP process is the vehicle the Service uses to make significant changes to its shape, ensuring that functions are planned, designed, and delivered in a way that balances available resources and community risk. This is a national process required under the Fire and Rescue National Framework.

- 2.2 Since 2010, our IRMP actions have been developed against a background of significant reductions in the budget available to the Authority as a result of changes in Government spending.

- 2.3 Members will recall that actions implemented to date are:

Year 1

- The removal of G02 (Wallsend) on 1st July 2014 (month 1)
- The removal of Y02 (Swalwell) on 3rd July 2014 (month 1)
- The stand down of two appliances between the hours of 00:00 to 08:59 hours from 5th January 2015 (month 7)
- The introduction of two part time Targeted Response Vehicles (TRVs) on 20th May 2015 (month 11)
- The introduction of the Unwanted Fire Signals Policy and Procedure on 1st June 2015 (month 12)

Year 2

- The introduction of two full time TRVs on 4th September 2015 (month 15)
- The removal of C02 (Colby Court) and N02 (Sunderland) on 4th September 2015 (month 15)
- The introduction of the Cobra cold cutting system from Sept 15 to March 16.

3 REMOVAL OF APPLIANCES

- 3.1 Front line appliances have now been removed from four locations (A,G,T, and Y) and a further two have been replaced by TRVs (C,N). This paper reports on the impact of all of these, except T and Y which were removed outside of the monitoring period referred to in 1.1.
- 3.2 Some common trends have emerged. For all incident risk levels, year one overall saw a small increase in average first appliance attendance times (4 seconds), with some areas actually experiencing a decrease. In year two, further increases occurred (average 43 seconds).
- 3.3 However, when TRV attendances are removed, the average first appliance attendance time in year one was the same as the 2013/14 figure. The year two average was a one second increase on 2013/14. This indicates the positive impact of the introduction of TRVs, which will be expanded on later in the report.
- 3.4 The impact of the changes to the response model on first appliance attendance times to risk level one incidents has been minimal with a decrease of 1 second in year one, followed by an increase of 2 seconds in year two, both against the 2013/14 benchmark figure.
- 3.5 Second appliance attendance times increased by an average 6 seconds in year one, and by 31 seconds in year two. For risk level one incidents the increase was also 6 seconds for year one, and 17 seconds in year two. Some increases were anticipated because of the removal of four category two appliances, (which traditionally provide the second appliance at most incidents), in the monitored period.
- 3.6 It is worth highlighting that the average increase of the second appliance attendance time in the Swalwell (Y) station area have seen greater increases than elsewhere in the Service (1 minute 46 seconds in year one, 1 minute 53 seconds in year two, compared to 2013/14).
- 3.7 The location of Station Y means that any supporting appliance has to travel along the A1M, where there has been major roadworks over the period, or across the river Tyne, where greater congestion than normal has occurred as a result of the A1M roadworks. The incidents in this station area can also have protracted attendance times due to rural locations and the distances to be

covered. The average attendance time to risk level one incidents (9 minutes 28 seconds) remains lower than the benchmark of the 2013/14 attendance time of Rainton Bridge CFS (10 minutes 10 seconds).

4 STAND DOWN OF APPLIANCES 00:00 TO 08:59 HRS

- 4.1 This action is now fully imbedded, and the methodology applied has developed and matured following feedback from operational crews and the Fire Brigades Union. All metrics used in the monitoring process show that attendance times are comparable with the Service average for the full 24 hour period.

5 INJURIES TO THE PUBLIC FROM FIRES

- 5.1 Injuries to the public reduced by 20% (40 injuries) in year one to 157, 4 of which were classed as serious. In year two there were 130 recorded injuries, a 17% reduction compared to year one (27 injuries) and a 34% reduction (67 injuries) compared to 2013/14.

6 TARGETED RESPONSE VEHICLES

- 6.1 The introduction of TRVs into the Service's response model has been a real success. Following feedback from our crews, the equipment carried on the vehicles have been adapted and added to. Crews are now making consistent suggestions about how the scope of the TRVs can be expanded to improve operational efficiency.
- 6.2 TRVs have attended 147 incidents that have allowed a category one or category two appliance to be deployed to another incident in the same area at the same time.
- 6.3 TRVs by design, have a higher target attendance time than traditional appliances, as they are mobilised to low life/property risk fires (risk levels 3 and 4) where a fast attendance time is not as crucial as high risk fires, in order to still get a safe, positive resolution. As a result of TRVs attending lower risk fires, traditional appliances remain available to be mobilised to life risk fires. This is a major contributory factor of our continued fast attendance times to risk level one incidents.

7 UNWANTED FIRE SIGNALS (UwFS)

- 7.1 This policy was enacted on 1st June 2015. Year one saw a 28% reduction in calls received (1764) on the benchmark year for this action (2014/15), with a 52% reduction between the policy hours of 08:00 and 17:59 hrs (678 calls received). In addition, the number of AFA calls not attended during policy hours increased by 123%.
- 7.2 Work continues with stakeholders to gain further reductions, and officers are developing new tactics to reduce UwFS. Any significant alterations or developments in the policy will be brought before the Authority in future

dedicated reports.

8 COBRA COLDCUTTING TECHNOLOGY

- 8.1 This high pressure extinguishing technology has now been introduced across the fleet, including an Aerial Ladder Platform. The Service has developed ground breaking techniques in conjunction with the fire industry, and these are being applied to resolve incidents in a safe and efficient manner (where the equipment is appropriate for use). The techniques developed by TWFRS have been shared across the UK and with European colleagues.

9 OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND REVIEW

- 9.1 There were no performance issues attributable to the implementation of this review across both monitored years. Operational performance is kept under constant scrutiny through a robust performance and review process. Any raised or observed issues are thoroughly examined. This is a fundamental part of the Service's commitment to Firefighter safety and continuous improvement.

10 RISK MANAGEMENT

- 10.1 A risk assessment has been undertaken to ensure that the risk to the Authority has been minimised as far as practicable. The assessment has considered an appropriate balance between risk and control, the realisation of efficiencies, the most appropriate use of limited resources and a comprehensive evaluation of the benefits. The risk to the authority has been assessed as low utilising the standard risk matrix based on control measures being in place.

11 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

- 11.1 There are no financial implications in respect of this report.

12 EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS IMPLICATIONS

- 12.1 There are no equality and fairness implications in respect of this report.

13 HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

- 13.1 There are no health and safety implications in respect of this report.

14 RECOMMENDATIONS

- 14.1 The Authority is recommended to:
- a) Endorse the contents of this report
 - b) Receive further reports as appropriate.